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ABSTRACT
Analysis of United States foreign policy is a constant in academia and
the media. Among the widely analyzed and hotly debated issues on U.S.
foreign policy is its relationship with the International Criminal Court
(ICC). Yet, there has been little research on American public opinion if the
U.S. should be more involved with the ICC. This paper analyzes historical
and contemporary U.S. foreign policy on the ICC as well as American public opinion regarding greater U.S. involvement with the court. To accomplish these goals, we analyze data from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ June 2010 Global Views survey, a nationally representative survey of
U.S. adults. The analysis focuses on various ICC-related topics, chief
among them being whether the United States should join the ICC. In addition, we examine if support for the ICC varies across various demographic
and attitudinal variables, such as age, sex, race, income, political ideology,
and support for multilateralism. This issue is first examined at a bivariate
level of analysis and then within a multivariate framework to identify the
most salient predictors of support for the ICC.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union there has been much debate
over United States foreign policy, particularly its role as a superpower, its decision to enter into armed conflicts with Afghanistan
and Iraq, its treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, and its overall policy concerning the war on terrorism. Included on this list is
debate on United States foreign policy and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted on July 17, 1998, by a
vote of 120 to 7.1 While most United States’ allies, such as the United
Kingdom and France, voted in favor of the statute, the United States
was one of the seven states that voted against its adoption.2 And,
while United States cooperation with the ICC has improved since
the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, its foreign policy
remains the same, and there is no indication it will join the court in
the near future.3
There has been overwhelming scholarship written on United
States foreign policy and the ICC. However, little has been written
on public opinion and the ICC, since much of the scholarship is
found in legal journals. Indeed, as recently noted, “[T]he topic has
been virtually ignored by social scientists.”4 Yet, this is an important
issue to consider, as the position of the United States Government
regarding the ICC may not necessarily be reflective of American
public opinion. Unfortunately, it is a difficult task to attempt to assess public opinion of the ICC, as “barely any public opinion surveys
have been conducted asking citizens about their attitudes towards
the court.”5
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to determine if
United States foreign policy on the International Criminal Court reflects the

1 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 9th plen. mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.9
(Jan. 25, 1999).
2 See Id. ¶¶ 28, 51–52, 99 (detailing respectively, why the United States’ voted
against the Statute, the United Kingdom’s interpretation of portions of the Statute,
and France’s decision to vote in favor of the Statute).
3 Harry M. Rhea, The United States and International Criminal Tribunals: An Introduction, in 14 Supranational Criminal Law: Capita Selecta, 207-10 (2012).
4 Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 411, 412 (2013).
5 Id. at 426.
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prevailing views of the American public. Second, it examines, in a multivariate manner, the demographic and ideological predictors of
public support for various ICC-related activities. To accomplish
these goals, we analyze data from the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs’ June 2010 Global Views survey, a nationally representative
survey of U.S. adults. Prior to describing the data in greater detail
and presenting the results of our analyses, we first provide a brief
history of the ICC and U.S. foreign policy relating to it. We then
discuss prior thinking and research pertaining to the manner in
which political ideology, support for globalization, and multilateralism might be related to support for foreign policy in general and,
in particular, the ICC.
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ICC
The Allied and Associate Powers established the Commission on
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement
of Penalties on January 25, 1919 to report on which states were responsible for initiating the First World War and the constitution and
procedure of a court appropriate for criminal prosecutions of war
criminals.6 The majority of states on the Commission favored establishing an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of Wilhelm II, former Kaiser of Germany, who fled to the Netherlands.
However, the United States argued against an international criminal
tribunal and favored national and multinational trials.7 Ultimately,
its position prevailed and an international criminal tribunal was not
established.
Twenty years after the end of the First World War, the League of
Nations adopted the first treaty for a permanent international criminal court.8 The purpose of the Convention for the Establishment of
6 Draft Resolution Relative to the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
the Enforcement of Penalties (1919), reprinted in III Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919, 202 (1958).
7 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime
& Punishment 31-32, 48-49 (Simon Dixon et al. eds., 2014); Rhea, supra note 3, at 2146; James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War 75-77 (Greenwood Press 1982); Harry M.
Rhea, The Commission on the Responsibility of the Author of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties and its Contribution to International Criminal Justice After WWII, 25 Crim.
L.F. 147, 165 (2014); Harry M. Rhea, The United States and International Criminal Tribunals: An Historical Analysis, 16 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 19, 20-21 (2009).
8 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16,
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an International Criminal Court was to prosecute violations of the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The
United States was not a member of the League of Nations and did
not participate in the negotiations. The League of Nation’s international criminal court never came to fruition as the Convention failed
to receive a sufficient number of ratifications prior to the impending
Second World War.9
Without an international criminal court to prosecute Nazis for
their crimes during the Second World War, the United States initiated the development of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, a multinational criminal court that shared jurisdiction with
the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France for the prosecution
of German war criminals.10 The International Military Tribunal was
not “international” per se; rather it was a multinational court, as
only four States participated in the trial.11
The United Nations General Assembly affirmed the Nuremberg
Principles on December 11, 1946, shortly after the International Military Tribunal completed its trial.12 Genocide was affirmed an international crime on the same day.13 The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide was adopted on December 9, 1948.14
The United States strongly supported its adoption, including a reference for an “international penal tribunal” in Article 6 with jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators accused of committing genocide.15
1937, 19 L.N.O.J. 37. The Rome Statute is often incorrectly cited as the first adopted
statute for a permanent international criminal court. The Rome Statute is, however,
the first statute of a permanent international criminal court to enter into force.
9 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute 4 (2010); 1 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated Text 24 (2005); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary
History 11 (1998).
10 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal, 13 DEP’T ST. BULL. 222, 222-223 (1945) (detailing the ongoing goal of
prosecuting German war criminals and outlining the creation of the International
Military Tribunal).
11 B.V.A. Röling, The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction Since 1945, in
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 329, 356 (1961).
12 G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/95(I) (Dec.
11, 1946).
13 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(I) (Dec.
11, 1946).
14 G.A. Res. 260 (IIII) A, U.N. GAOR, 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948).
15 Harry M. Rhea, United States Foreign Policy and the International Penal Tribunal
in the Genocide Convention: Article VI and Beyond, 9 (2) GENOCIDE STUD. INT’L 186, 187
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Consequently, the General Assembly initiated the study of an international criminal jurisdiction immediately following the adoption of
the Genocide Convention.16 The study was indefinitely placed on
hold in 1954 due to the height of the Cold War and absence of a definition of the crime of aggression.17
Discussion of establishing the ICC was not resurrected again until 1989, when Trinidad and Tobago submitted its draft proposal for
the General Assembly. The proposal was adopted on December 4,
1989, and the International Law Commission (ILC) was invited to
study the possibility of establishing an international criminal
court.18 At the time the United States was suspicious of the ICC but
thought it was worthy of discussion.19
The United States did not fully support the early reports of the
ILC. Its responses complimented the ILC’s hard work but criticized
its lack of consideration of legal questions.20 The United States
showed the most support for the concept of the International Criminal Court in 1994, after the ILC adopted a draft statute for an international criminal court. According to David Scheffer, then Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, the ILC’s draft statute was a
good starting point.21
The General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee and,
subsequently, the Preparatory Committee on an International Criminal Court.22 At this point, United States support for the ICC began
to diminish. Non-government organizations played a large role in

(2015).

16 G.A. Res. 260 (III) B, U.N. GAOR, 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948).
17 G.A. Res. 898 (IX), U.N. GAOR, 504th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/898(IX)
(Dec. 4, 1954).
18 G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 72nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A.RES/44/39 (Dec.
4, 1989).
19 Rhea, supra note 3, at 156.
20 See Comments of Governments on the report of the Working Group on the question
of an international criminal jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN.4/452 (1993), reprinted in
[1993] II(I) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, at 141-143 (outlining the United States’ comments
including its opinion on the jurisdiction of the court and surrender of defendants
to the court).
21 Interview with David J. Scheffer, former Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues (June 24, 2008).
22 G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/53 (Dec.
9, 1994) (establishing ad hoc committee); G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 87th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 (Dec. 11, 1995) (establishing preparatory committee).
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molding the legal procedures of the ICC. Many States and non-government organizations did not approve of the Court being closely
related to the Security Council and wanted an independent prosecutor to be free to open investigations proprio motu.23 The United
States favored a larger role for the Security Council and greater
checks and balances on the prosecutor.24 These issues were unresolved, and the United States delegation at Rome was instructed to
vote against the adoption of the Rome Statute.25
Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, but
refused to submit it to the Senate for advise and consent for ratification, stating that there were many concerns with the statute that
needed to be addressed before the United States could become a
State Party to ICC.26 The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1,
2002, after the ratification of sixty States as required under Article
126.27 Consequently, George W. Bush’s administration submitted a
letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him
that the United States did not intend to become a State Party to the
ICC and that the United States had no legal obligations arising from
Clinton’s signature.28 The United States Senate subsequently passed
laws that prevent funding the ICC and allows the United States to
use any means necessary to regain custody of a United States national being held for prosecution.29
23 Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm’n on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Apr. 3, 1995-Apr. 13, 1995, Aug. 14, 1995-Aug. 25, 1995, UN Doc.
A/50/22, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22 (1995), at ¶¶ 25, 113, 114. See also Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 175, 176-77 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999); SCHABAS, supra note 9, at 176-77.
24 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 147 (1998) (statement of
the United States Delegation). See SCHABAS, supra note 9, at 178 (“Department of
State spokesman James Rubin had warned: ‘If neither the Security Council nor any
state endorses action by the Court, the prosecutor would act without a critical and
essential base of international consensus.’”).
25 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes
Tribunals 224 (Eric D. Weitz ed. 2012).
26 Schabas, supra note 9, at 28.
27 Id. at 23; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
28 Letter from John R. Bolton to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
Regarding the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (April 27, 2002), in
41 I.L.M. 1014 (2002).
29 See e.g., Schabas, supra note 9, at 30–31 (quoting the American Service Members’ Protection Act of 2002 in which its preamble states several ways that the U.S.
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3. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The ICC is an affirmation by the international community that
the most serious crimes shall not go unpunished.30 The crimes
within the ICC's jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of aggression.31 There are three ways the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction: first, a State Party to the Rome
Statute may refer a situation to the Office of the Prosecutor; second,
the United Nations Security Council may refer a situation to the Office of the Prosecutor using its Chapter 7 authority under the United
Nations Charter; third, the Prosecutor can open an investigation at
his or her discretion if there is sufficient evidence from reliable
sources that one of the crimes under Article 5 has been committed.32
The ICC operates under the principle of complementarity.33
States have jurisdiction over their territories and nationals, and the
ICC cannot interfere with a situation if national courts are willing
and able to investigate and prosecute international crimes. However, if a national court is either unable or unwilling to prosecute,
then the ICC's jurisdiction is triggered under the principle of complementarity. Therefore, the ICC is a court of last resort so that perpetrators of the most serious international crimes do not go unpunished.
Currently the ICC has not lived up to the expectations of its supporters. As of August 2014, the Court has only completed three trials: two of the verdicts were guilty and one was an acquittal.34 The
lack of success may not be the fault of the Court, as it does not have
the resources that most national jurisdictions enjoy. For example,
there is no international police force to enforce arrest warrants and
apprehend the accused. The Court also lacks sufficient financial
support from the Assembly of States Parties, the governing body of
the Court. The Security Council has referred two situations to the
Office of the Prosecutor that prohibit the use of United Nations

is prohibited from cooperating with the International Criminal Court).
30 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 27, at Preamble.
31 Id. at art. 5.
32 Id. at art. 13.
33 Id. at Preamble, art. 1.
34 Situations
and Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
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funds to support the investigations.35 Moreover, the African Union
has lost confidence in the Court and claims it is biased against Africa
as all of its investigations are in the region.36
4. CURRENT UNITED STATES - ICC RELATIONS
The United States relationship with the ICC is friendlier today
than in the past. While United States law prohibits funding the ICC,
it supports the Court when they share a common goal. For example,
the United States established its War Crimes Rewards Program in
2013. Under the War Crimes Rewards Program the United States
offers rewards up to $5 million to persons who provide information
regarding certain persons who have been charged with international
crimes, including those wanted by the ICC.37
The United States also recently supported a draft resolution to
the Security Council referring the situation in Syria to the ICC.38
However, United States support for the proposal has been criticized
since it supported sending the situation in Syria to the ICC after
China and Russia confirmed they would veto the proposal.39 While
this support would not have occurred during the Bush administration, it does not indicate that the United States supports, or is working towards joining, the ICC.
There were expectations that the Obama Administration would
change United States foreign policy towards the ICC.40 This has not
been the case. There has been no change in federal law preventing
financial support for the Court, and the United States continues to
35 S.C. Res. ¶ 4–8, 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1593,
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
36 Charles Chernor Jalloh, Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision
Course or Cooperation, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 203, 209 (2012); Kurt Mills, Bashir Is Dividing Us: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 404, 432 (2012).
37 War
Crimes
Rewards
Program,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/wcrp/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
38 Colum Lynch, U.S. to Support ICC War Crimes Prosecution in Syria, THE CABLE
(May 7, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/exclusive-u-s-to-supporticc-war-crimes- prosecution-in-syria/.
39 See, e.g., Mark Kersten, Unnecessary and Counter-Productive: Samantha Power
Explains US Position on ICC & Syria, JUST. IN CONFLICT (May 28, 2014), http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/05/28/unnecessary-counter-productive-samantha-power-explains-us-position-on-icc-syria/ (outlining inconsistences in the U.S. explanation
for putting forward the resolution).
40 RHEA, supra note 3, at 200–01.
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protect itself from its jurisdiction although it supports ad hoc international criminal tribunals established by the UN Security Council.41
These courts have limited temporal and territorial jurisdiction over
certain crimes. The support for ad hoc tribunals has resulted in the
misperception that the United States inconsistently supports international criminal courts, when in fact its foreign policy on a permanent international criminal court has been consistent since the First
World War.42
5. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ICC
Thus far most of the scholarship written on United States and
ICC relations focuses on law, foreign policy, and international relations. What is missing from scholarly debate is American public
opinion on the ICC and an examination of the factors that correlate
with support for it. As one scholar has written, “. . . [W]e know surprisingly little about public support for international courts . . .
[T]he topic has been virtually ignored by social scientists.”43 However, there are exceptions to this. For example, in 2003, the Pew
Global Attitudes Survey asked citizens in the United States and four
European countries if the International Criminal Court should have
the opportunity to prosecute national military personnel accused of
war crimes if their governments refused to prosecute them.44 In an
analysis of this data, Voeten found that a minority of Americans
(37%) was supportive of ICC prosecutions as described. 45
In addition to the 2003 Pew Survey, Gallup’s 2005 Voice of the
People study surveyed citizens from sixty-seven countries and the
province of Kosovo.46 Similar to Voeten's analysis of the 2003 Pew
41 The United States has strongly supported temporary international criminal
tribunals established by the Security Council, including the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. See RHEA,
supra note 3, at 201.
42 See generally RHEA, supra note 3.
43 Voeten, supra note 4, at 412.
44 PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, VIEWS OF A CHANGING
WORLD 101 (2003), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2003/06/ViewsOf-A-Changing-World-2003.pdf. See also Voeten, supra note 4, at 426 (reaffirming
the questions asked in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey).
45 Voeten, supra note 4, at 426.
46 Gallup Int’l Ass’n, Voice of the People, 2005, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM
FOR POL. AND SOC. RES. (July 16, 207), http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04636.v1.
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Survey, among participants of the Gallup study from the United
States, a greater percentage held unfavorable views of the ICC than
favorable views. In addition, Voeten found that citizenries who
were more favorable toward the United Nations, and perhaps global
governance more generally, tended to hold more favorable opinions
of the International Criminal Court.47 Outside of Voeten's analysis
of the 2003 Pew study and 2005 Gallup study, we are unaware of
any other academic publications that have examined U.S. public
opinion of the ICC and its correlates.
6. THE CURRENT STUDY
In light of the limited attention given to U.S. public opinion of
the ICC and the factors that predict support for the ICC in the academic literature, additional research is warranted. To that end, we
analyze U.S. public opinion data focused on various ICC-related
topics, chief among them being whether the United States should
join the ICC. In addition, we examine if support for the ICC varies
across various demographic and attitudinal variables, such as age,
sex, race, income, political ideology, and support for multilateralism. This issue is first examined at a bivariate level of analysis and
then within a multivariate framework to identify the most salient
predictors of support for the ICC.
Given that public opinion of international courts, including the
ICC, strongly correlates “with attitudes towards the international
organizations most closely associated with a particular court and
with legal values more generally,”48 we anticipated that individuals
who support globalization, who feel the U.S. should play a more
prominent role in world affairs, and who more strongly support a
multilateral viewpoint would be more likely to indicate support for
the ICC and its functions. Conversely, we anticipated that individuals who more strongly identify themselves as Republican would be
less likely to indicate support for the ICC. The attitudes of Ameri-

See also Voeten, supra note 4, at 427 (reaffirming the scope of the Voice of the People
survey).
47 Voeten, supra note 4, at 427. This was a macro-level (country-level) analysis
and not based on individual-level data. See Id. at 428 (displaying data points as
countries and not by individual).
48 Id. at 413.
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cans regarding the ICC often correlate with political ideology. Media outlets and literature perceive more Democrats than Republicans support greater American participation in multilateral institutions. Most conservative groups that support the Republican
ideology, including the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, support no U.S. involvement in the International
Criminal Court.
6.1. Data
Data for the current study come from the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs’ June 2010 Global Views survey,49 conducted by
Knowledge Networks. Participants for the Global Views survey
were recruited using a combination of random-digit dialing (RDD)
and addressed-based probability sampling methods to produce a
nationally-representative sample of U.S. adults ages 18 and older.
Administration of the surveys took place online; participants were
provided with access to the Internet and hardware if needed. The
survey elicited valid data from approximately 2,600 respondents.
As reported by Knowledge Networks, the response rate was 66%.
For some of the items on the survey, a random selection of half
of the participants were asked to provide responses. This was true
of the items relating to the ICC. Thus, the current analysis focuses
on information reported on by approximately 1,300 respondents. As
was expected given the random nature of selection, a t-test examination of mean level differences in participant age, race, gender, education, and income between the randomly selected participants
who responded to the ICC survey items and those who were not
selected revealed no statistically significant differences. All analyses
to be presented were executed using the post-stratification sampling
weight provided by Knowledge Networks to account for the complex nature of the sampling design.

49 Marshall M. Bouton, Steven Kull, Benjamin Page, Silvia Veltcheva, &
Thomas Wright, Global Views 2010: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,
RESOURCE CTR. FOR MINORITY DATA (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ RCMD/studies/31022.
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6.2. ICC Variables
Three items on the survey pertained to public sentiment regarding the ICC. The first item asked, "Based on what you know, do you
think the U.S. should or should not participate in the agreement on
the International Criminal Court that can try individuals for war
crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity if their own country
won't try them?" Potential responses included "Should Participate,"
"Should Not Participate," and a category indicating the respondent
was not sure or refused to answer. Of the 1,277 participants queried,
70.3% said the U.S. should participate, 26.2% indicated the U.S.
should not participate, and 3.5% refused or were not sure. Thus, by
this measure of Supporting Participation in the ICC, the vast majority of the U.S. public supports participation, despite the fact that the
U.S. does not currently participate.
The second item on the survey relating to the ICC read, "Some
say that because of the increasing interaction between countries, we
need to strengthen international institutions to deal with shared
problems. Others say this would only create bigger, unwieldy bureaucracies. Please tell me if the ICC needs to be strengthened." Potential responses included, "Yes, Needs to Be Strengthened," "No,
Doesn't Need to Be Strengthened," and a category for "not sure" and
refusals. Of the 1,300 respondents queried, 50.1% said the ICC needs
to be strengthened, 41.5% indicated the ICC doesn't need to be
strengthened, and 8.4% refused or were not sure. Thus, while less
dramatic than the differences in the distribution of responses to the
first measure, the Support for Strengthening the ICC measure reveals that a majority of the U.S. public does feel the ICC needs
strengthening, if only by a modest margin.
The third item on the survey relating to the ICC read, "In order
to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or
oppose the trial of suspected terrorists in the International Criminal
Court." Potential responses included, "Favor," "Oppose," and a category for "not sure" and refusals. Of the 1,278 respondents queried,
75.0% said they favor the trial of suspected terrorists in the ICC,
20.0% indicated they do not favor it, and 5.0% refused or were not
sure. Thus, as with the first ICC-related measure, the Support for
the ICC Trying Terrorists measure shows that a clear majority of the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

752

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:2

American public endorses the ICC, at least with regard to trying suspected terrorists.50
6.3. Demographic Variables
In order to assess whether various demographic variables are related to responses to the three ICC-related items on the survey, the
present analysis includes information on respondent age, gender,
race, education, income, and political identification. Respondent
age is a continuous measure provided in whole years; gender is
coded as male and female (female is the reference category = 0 in the
multivariate models); race is categorized into White and Nonwhite,
as 75% of the sample was White (White is the reference category = 0
in the multivariate models). Respondent education is a four-category ordinal measure with four response options of "less than high
school" (=1); "high school diploma" (=2), "some college" (=3), and
"bachelor's degree or higher" (=4). Income is an ordinal measure
with nineteen categories ranging from "Less than $5,000" (=1) to
"$175,000 or more" (=19). Last, political identification was measured
using a seven-category scale that asked respondents, "Do you generally think of yourself as..." Responses ranged from "Strong Republican" (=1) to "Strong Democrat" (7). Thus, higher scores for this item
indicate a respondent who more closely identifies as being a Democrat.
6.4. Worldview Variables
In addition to considering the relationships between responses
to the ICC measures and the demographic variables, we also drew
on items included in the survey to capture aspects of respondent attitudes and opinions concerning international affairs. First, respondents were asked, "Do you believe that globalization, especially
the increasing connections of our economy with others around the
world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States?" Re-

50 For the bivariate and multivariate analyses to follow, the small number of
refusals and responses of "not sure" were treated as missing, enabling us to provide
a more straightforward method of investigating how support/lack of support for
different aspects of the ICC are related to the variables to be described shortly.
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sponses options included, "Mostly Good," "Mostly Bad," and a category for "not sure" or refusal to answer. For the multivariate analysis, refusals/responses of "not sure" were treated as missing, and
"Mostly Bad" was treated as the reference category (= 0) for the Support for Globalization measure. Second, respondents were asked,
"Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take
an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?”
Response options included, "Active Part," "Stay Out," and a category
for "not sure" or refusal to answer. For the multivariate analysis,
refusals/responses of "not sure" were treated as missing, and "Stay
Out" was treated as the reference category (= 0) for the Active in
World Affairs measure.
Third, we constructed a measure tapping respondent Multilateralism based on responses to three items (α = .63). 51 Specifically,
respondents were asked, "Below is a list of possible foreign policy
goals that the United States might have. For each one please select
whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy
goal of the United States (=3), a somewhat important foreign policy
goal (=2), or not an important goal at all (=1)." The three goals we
included to measure respondent multilateralism were: protecting
weaker nations against foreign aggression, strengthening the United
Nations, and promoting and defending human rights in other countries. The measure for multilateralism was created by taking the average of the scores for the 3 items; higher scores represent greater
support for multilateralism.
6.5. Analysis Plan
The analysis proceeded in two steps. First, we constructed a series of bivariate cross-tabs as a preliminary means to assessing the
association between each of the three ICC measures and the demographic and worldview variables; F-tests were used to determine
whether these bivariate associations were statistically significant.
The second part of the analysis involved conducting a series of logistic regressions to assess the extent to which each of the demographic and worldview variables predict support for each of the
51 Given that alpha values are partially a function of the number of items included in a scale, failure to meet the conventional threshold of 0.70 is not unexpected. Further, as we will demonstrate, the three-item measure is related to the
ICC measures in expected ways.
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three ICC-related measures while controlling for each of the other
demographic and worldview variables simultaneously. As responses to each of the ICC-related items we have described can be
viewed as implicitly endorsing or failing to endorse the ICC, the responses of "Should Participate," "Does Need Strengthening," and
"Favor" that correspond to each of the respective ICC items are
coded as values of 1, while "Should Not Participate," "Doesn't Need
Strengthening," and "Oppose" are coded as values of 0. Because refusals and "not sure" responses have been set to missing values, logistic regression is justified when analyzing variables with only two
values (i.e., 0 and 1).
7. RESULTS

7.1. Bivariate Analyses
Table 1 provides the results of the cross-tab analysis describing
the percent of respondents who support U.S. participation in the
ICC. As can be seen, across each of the variables, a substantive majority of U.S. adults are in favor of the U.S. participating in the ICC.
At the same time, significant differences did emerge across certain
variables. Specifically, respondents with more education, who identify themselves and increasingly aligned with Democrats, who view
globalization as a good thing, who feel the U.S. should play a more
active role in world affairs, and who hold a more multilateral viewpoint are statistically more likely to support U.S. participation in the
ICC. For example, whereas only 61% of respondents with less than
a high school diploma support U.S. participation in the ICC, that
percentage rises to 72% among respondents who have at least a
bachelor's degree. Likewise, only 65% of respondents with a score
for multilateralism of 2.00 or less support U.S. participation in the
ICC, whereas 85% of respondents with a maximum score of 3.00 for
multilateralism support U.S. participation in the ICC.
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Table 1. Percent of Respondents Supporting U.S. Participation in the ICC by Various Attributes
Age (N=1236)

Political Identification (N=1236)

18-24

73.16%

Strong Republican

60.72%

25-39

73.55%

Not Strong Republican

70.52%

40-59

72.20%

Leans Reublican

67.49%

60+

72.85%

Undecided

70.23%

* Measure collapsed for simplification

Leans Democrat

84.21%

* F-test not significant

Not Strong Democrat

78.47%

Strong Democrat

81.88%

Gender (N=1236)

* F-test significant at p<.001

Male

72.00%

Female

73.73%

* F-test not significant
Race (N=1236)

View of Globalization (N = 1210)
Mostly Bad

67.12%

Mostly Good

77.14%

* F-test significant at p<.01

White

71.74%

NonWhite

75.48%

* F-test not significant
Education (N=1236)

Opinion on World Affairs (N=1223)
Stay Out

62.59%

Play Active Part

77.40%

* F-test significant at p<.001

Less than H.S.

61.09%

H.S. Diploma

74.82%

Some College

76.41%

1.00 - 2.00

64.59%

Bachelors +

71.90%

2.01 - 2.99

81.55%

3.00

84.94%

* F-test significant at p<.05

Multilateralism (N=1234)

* Measure collapsed for simplification
Income (N=1236)

* F-test significant at p<.001

$0 - $24,999

72.90%

$25,000 - $49,999

75.96%

$50,000 - $84,999

73.21%

$85,000+

68.85%

* Measure collapsed for simplification
* F-test not significant
Responses of "not sure" and refusals were set to missing

Table 2 provides the results of the cross-tab analysis describing
the percent of respondents who support strengthening the ICC. Unlike the broad consensus for U.S. participation in the ICC, overall
public sentiment as to whether the ICC needs to be strengthened is
more equivocal. However, significant differences are evinced across
various personal attributes and opinions of respondents. In particular, females, Nonwhites, participants who are increasingly aligned
with Democrats, and those holding a more multilateral position are
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more likely to feel the ICC needs strengthening (there are marginally
significant differences for the globalization and world affairs variables). Conversely, respondents with more education and who have
a larger income are less likely to feel the ICC needs strengthening.
Differences in the percent of respondents feeling the ICC needs
strengthening are particularly pronounced according to respondent
political alignments: Only 36% of participants who view themselves
as strong Republicans feel the ICC needs to be strengthened,
whereas 67% of participants who view themselves as strong Democrats feel the ICC needs to be strengthened. A similar contrast is
seen across scores for multilateralism: only 43% of respondents with
Table 2. Percent of Respondents Supporting Strengthening the ICC by Various Attributes
Age (N=1205)

Political Identification (N=1205)

18-24

51.94%

Strong Republican

35.72%

25-39

58.27%

Not Strong Republican

54.53%

40-59

52.65%

Leans Reublican

34.78%

60+

54.63%

Undecided

59.33%

* Measure collapsed for simplification

Leans Democrat

65.33%

* F-test not significant

Not Strong Democrat

58.44%

Strong Democrat

66.98%

Gender (N=1205)

* F-test significant at p<.001

Male

49.87%

Female

59.52%

* F-test significant at p<.01
Race (N=1205)

View of Globalization (N = 1189)
Mostly Bad

50.75%

Mostly Good

57.47%

* F-test significant at p<.10

White

50.97%

NonWhite

63.47%

* F-test significant at p<.01
Education (N=1205)

Opinion on World Affairs (N=1188)
Stay Out

49.61%

Play Active Part

56.52%

* F-test significant at p<.10

Less than H.S.

57.15%

H.S. Diploma

61.78%

Some College

52.46%

1.00 - 2.00

42.59%

Bachelors +

48.87%

2.01 - 2.99

61.43%

3.00

83.98%

* F-test significant at p<.05

Multilateralism (N=1205)

* Measure collapsed for simplification
Income (N=1205)

* F-test significant at p<.001

$0 - $24,999

66.07%

$25,000 - $49,999

56.82%

$50,000 - $84,999

49.62%

$85,000+

45.68%

* Measure collapsed for simplification
* F-test significant at p<.001
Responses of "not sure" and refusals were set to missing
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a score of 2.00 or less feel the ICC needs to be strengthened, while
84% of respondents with a maximum score of 3.00 feel the ICC needs
to be strengthened.
Table 3 provides the results of the cross-tab analysis describing
the percent of respondents who support having the ICC bring suspected terrorists to trial. As was true regarding support for having
the U.S. participate in the ICC, the overwhelming majority of the
U.S. public supports having the ICC bring suspected terrorists before the court. Even among participants who call themselves strong
Republicans, 70% of such individuals support bringing suspected
terrorists before the ICC. Still, we do find evidence of meaningful
Table 3. Percent of Respondents Supporting Having the ICC Try Terrorists by Various Attributes
Age (N=1215)

Political Identification (N=1215)

18-24

82.13%

Strong Republican

70.00%

25-39

79.15%

Not Strong Republican

74.58%

40-59

77.00%

Leans Reublican

70.72%

60+

80.69%

Undecided

79.27%

* Measure collapsed for simplification

Leans Democrat

87.28%

* F-test not significant

Not Strong Democrat

83.46%

Strong Democrat

86.40%

Gender (N=1215)

* F-test significant at p<.01

Male

75.84%

Female

81.74%

* F-test significant at p<.05
Race (N=1215)

Mostly Bad

70.71%

Mostly Good

84.59%

* F-test significant at p<.001

White

79.20%

NonWhite

78.48%

* F-test not significant
Education (N=1215)
Less than H.S.

View of Globalization (N = 1190)

Opinion on World Affairs (N=1199)
Stay Out

73.45%

Play Active Part

81.45%

* F-test significant at p<.05
74.99%

H.S. Diploma

76.68%

Some College

83.56%

1.00 - 2.00

73.14%

Bachelors +

78.70%

2.01 - 2.99

88.60%

3.00

78.43%

* F-test not significant

Multilateralism (N=1213)

* Measure collapsed for simplification
Income (N=1215)

* F-test significant at p<.001

$0 - $24,999

77.01%

$25,000 - $49,999

81.28%

$50,000 - $84,999

81.35%

$85,000+

76.02%

* Measure collapsed for simplification
* F-test not significant
Responses of "not sure" and refusals were set to missing
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differences across individual attributes. Females, those who increasingly align with Democrats, those who feel globalization is a good
thing, those who feel the U.S should play a more active role in world
affairs, and those who score higher on multilateralism are statistically more likely to support bringing suspected terrorists before the
ICC, though the association for multilateralism appears to be nonlinear, as greatest support was found at the mid-range of scores.
7.2. Multivariable Analyses
Having examined how support for the ICC varies across a number of demographic attributes and ideological stances at the bivariate level, we next examined these associations in multivariate logistic regression models. Because bivariate analyses cannot rule out
the potential that the statistically significant associations revealed in
Tables 1-3 are spurious, multivariate models that can take into account the potential confounding influence of multiple variables simultaneously are needed. As stated earlier, logistic regression was
chosen given that each of the ICC variables are dichotomous indicators. Results are presented and discussed with regard to the Odds
Ratios (ORs), with ORs statistically larger than 1.00 indicating
higher scores on predictor variables are associated with greater support for the ICC, and ORs statistically smaller than 1.00 indicating
higher scores on predictor variables are associated with less support
for the ICC. Each of the three models to be discussed included each
of the demographic and worldview variables in order to assess the
direct effect of each variable on the corresponding ICC-related outcome after parceling out the influence of each of the other variables.
Model 1 of Table 4 presents the Odds Ratios for predicting respondent support for having the U.S. participate in the ICC. Three
of the eight ORs are statistically significant. In particular, participants who increasingly align themselves with Democrats (OR =
1.18), who feel the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs
(OR = 1.57), and who have an increasingly multilateral viewpoint
(OR = 2.59) are more likely to feel the U.S. should participate in the
ICC. The previously significant effects for respondent education
and views on globalization found in Table 1 have been reduced to
non-significance. Turning attention to Model 2 predicting respondent beliefs that the ICC needs to be strengthened, three of the eight
ORs are statistically significant. Specifically, respondents who make
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more money are significantly less likely to feel the ICC needs
strengthening (OR = 0.96), while those who increasingly align themselves with Democrats (OR = 1.13) and who have a more multilateral
viewpoint (OR = 3.17) are significantly more likely to feel the ICC
needs strengthening. These results are consistent with those reported in Table 2. However, the effects for gender, race, and education have been reduced to non-significance.
Table 4. Logistic Regressions of Support for ICC
Model 1: Support for
U.S. Participation in
the ICC (N = 1200)
Variable

Model 2: Support for
Strengthening the ICC
(N=1176)

Model 3: Support for
Bringing Terrorists
Before the ICC (N = 1178)

OR

SE

OR

SE

OR

SE

Age

1.00

0.01

1.00

0.01

1.00

0.01

Male

0.97

0.17

0.83

0.13

0.76

0.15

Nonwhite

0.92

0.20

1.12

0.22

0.61*

0.13

Education Level

1.10

0.12

0.99

0.09

1.11

0.13

Income

1.00

0.02

0.96*

0.02

1.00

0.03

1.18**

0.06

1.13**

0.05

1.18**

0.06

1.17

0.21

0.99

0.16

1.96**

0.38

1.57*

0.31

1.03

0.19

1.18

0.24

2.59***

0.49

3.17***

0.54

2.39***

Alignment with Democrats
Support for Globalization
Active U.S. in World Affairs
Multilateralism
F-Statistic

7.92***

9.83***

0.52
7.62***

OR = Odds Ratio; SE = Standard Error; *p<.05, **p<.01; ***p<.001

The final model of Table 4 (Model 3) presents the results of the
logistic regression predicting support for having suspected terrorists brought before the ICC. Four of the eight ORs are statistically
significant. While Nonwhites are less likely to support having terrorists brought before the ICC (OR = 0.61), respondents who increasingly align themselves with Democrats (OR = 1.19), who feel globalization is a good thing (OR = 1.96), and who have a more
multilateral viewpoint (OR = 2.39) are significantly more likely to
support having terrorists brought before the ICC. The previously
significant effect for views on U.S. involvement in world affairs reported in Table 3 has been reduced to non-significance.
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to determine if United States foreign
policy on the ICC reflects American public opinion as of 2010. This
is a very important question to address, since the ICC is the only
permanent court established to prosecute the most serious crimes of
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international concern, and United States foreign policy should reflect the positions of the American people.
According to the results of our analysis of the 2010 Global Views
survey, current U.S. foreign policy does not appear to reflect American public opinion on U.S. participation in the ICC. In particular,
we found that a clear majority of the U.S. public supports U.S. participation in the ICC. This was true even among individuals who
identify themselves as strongly Republican. Even greater support
among the U.S. public was found for having the ICC try terrorists.
These findings are notable, given prior studies (the 2003 PEW Study
and the 2005 Gallup Study) found that a majority of the U.S. public
was unsupportive of the ICC. Thus, within the span of only a decade, there appears to have been a notable shift in public sentiment
surrounding the ICC.
When examining support for U.S. participation in the ICC,
strengthening the ICC, and having the ICC try terrorists within a
multivariate framework, two variables were consistent predictors.
Specifically, individuals who increasingly align themselves with
Democrats and who have an increasingly multilateral viewpoint are
more likely to support the ICC, believe it needs to be strengthened,
and agree that it should try terrorists.
The findings of this study should be considered in light of a
number of factors. First, there is the question of how much the participants, as well as the American public, are aware of the ICC's legal
jurisdiction and procedure. For example, would support for U.S.
involvement with the ICC diminish if participants were aware that
the ICC does not include some U.S. Constitutional protections, such
as a trial by jury and protection against double jeopardy? While
these are sacred protections provided for in the U.S. Constitution,
the Rome Statute is a mixture of legal practices within the international community, and many states do not practice jury trials.
Another important factor to consider is if the public’s opinion of
domestic courts reflects its opinion of international courts. According to credible commitment theorists, public support for international courts should be high when support for their national courts
are low.52 Yet, it is the contrary. “[B]oth across and within countries
citizens who trust their domestic courts more also have more trust
in international courts,” thus “citizens see international courts not
as substitutes for, but as extensions to the domestic rule of law.”53
52
53

Voeten, supra note 4, at 414.
Id.
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While many members of minority groups show less confidence,
most Americans “have at least a moderate amount of trust” in
United States domestic courts.54 American public opinion of the ICC
reflects its opinion of domestic courts. Therefore, Americans who
support greater U.S. participation in the ICC may see the court as an
extension to American domestic courts rather than a separate international institution with its own rule of law.
In addition, despite our effort, there still remains relatively little
academic research concerning U.S. public opinion of the ICC. Our
research is only a small piece of the puzzle, and there are important
things to consider moving forward. In particular, future research
should inform survey participants of the Rome Statute’s substantive
and procedural laws prior to inquiring about their support for the
ICC and its functions. This should include describing the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle and its lack of U.S. Constitutional
protections, as well as potential consequences on U.S. military operations if the court were to have jurisdiction over government officials and military service men and women. Taking these steps may
provide us with a more valid understanding of the public's informed opinion of the ICC.
In conclusion, this paper’s findings demonstrate that American
public opinion of the ICC is positive, which indicates that United
States public sentiment has shifted in recent years. However, it is
unlikely that United States foreign policy on the ICC will be reversed in the foreseeable future. For now, the United States continues to work with the ICC when there is common interest. In the
meantime, more public discussion is needed between government
officials and their constituents to work towards a proper foreign policy on the ICC that represents the American public opinion. To this
end, academic researchers have a responsibility to better inform
government officials of research focused on public opinion.

54 Public Trust and Confidence, Resource Guide, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Community/Public-Trust-and-Confidence/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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